I Will Follow: Smart Power and the Management of Wartime Alliances

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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

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ABSTRACT This paper employs the concept of smart power to construct an analytical framework for assessing wartime alliance management. It makes two arguments. First, wartime sources of soft power differ from those obtaining during peacetime. Second, the coerciveness with which an alliance leader wields hard power towards actual or prospective allies should vary inversely with the amount of soft power it possesses. The smart power framework illuminates three types of alliance management failure. The paper's key contentions are illustrated with examples furnished from the record of US alliance leadership since World War II.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's famous quip that the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them captures the often agonizing difficulties of wartime alliance management. As the leader of several international alliances since World War II, the United States has compiled an erratic track record on this score.[1] On the one hand, during World War II and the Persian Gulf War of 1991, US Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and George H. W. Bush, respectively, presided over enormously successful and highly cohesive coalitions. On

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[1]In this paper, I employ the terms 'alliance' and 'alliance leader' loosely. I use the former to denote the wartime behavior of both formal standing alliances and informal ad hoc coalitions. I use the latter to denote the most powerful member of a given wartime alliance, which nominally bears the greatest share of responsibility for the alliance's functioning and has the most resources to deploy on its behalf. Logically, any alliance member can deploy hard and soft power towards its partners during wartime, but non-leading (or weaker) members will generally have smaller amounts of both varieties of power to deploy and their efforts will thereby be less salient in influencing the dynamics of the alliance.

the other hand, the tenuous partnerships assembled by President George W. Bush during the post-9/11/2001 US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proved to be brittle and minimally cooperative.[2]

In this paper, I examine the phenomenon of wartime alliance leadership through Joseph S. Nye's conceptual prism of smart power. I advance two broad arguments on the use of smart power in wartime alliance management, furnishing illustrative evidence from the record of US alliance leadership since World War II. My central argument is twofold. First, during wartime, the bases of soft power differ substantially from those prevailing during peacetime and largely lie beyond the control of policymakers. The three primary bases of soft power advanced by Nye of culture, political values, and foreign policy legitimacy only hold in a peacetime context. During wartime, an alliance leader's soft power instead largely derives from two different sources, namely, the magnitude of external threat confronting a given state and the alliance leader's power to confront that threat. A third, subsidiary source of soft power is the alliance leader's provision of 'voice opportunities' to its partners. Second, although all alliances are forged and maintained through the deployment of both hard and soft power resources, the optimal level of coerciveness with which an alliance leader deploys hard power should vary inversely with the amount of soft power it possesses.

The rest of the article is divided into four sections. In the first section, I discuss Nye's key concepts of hard power and soft power, noting that their progenitor only briefly and inadequately applies them to the salient domain of wartime alliance behavior. Second, I discuss why the three primary bases of soft power proposed by Nye exclusively pertain to peacetime conditions and propose an alternative set of three wartime sources of soft power. Third, I explain why hard and soft power should vary inversely in a 'smart' strategy of alliance management and I propose a typology of four strategies for the use of hard power by alliance leaders toward actual or prospective partners. Fourth, I explain how alliance leaders can fail to exercise smart power by falling victim to one of three management pathologies. I conclude with some recommendations to help guide US policymakers construct more robust wartime alliances and coalitions in the future, should they become necessary.

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[2]William H. McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict 1941–1946* (New York: Johnson Reprints Corp. 1970); Patricia A. Weitsman, *Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence* (Stanford UP 2014), Chs. 3, 5, and 6 (48–73, 99–163).

Nye's Three Forms of Political Power

A recurring theme in Nye's works is his concern with the bias that scholars and policymakers have evinced towards hard power, or 'the ability to get the outcomes one wants through coercion or payment.'[3] Nye faults both groups for their tendency to neglect what he dubs soft power, or 'the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.'[4] Although he concedes that on occasion, hard power resources can generate soft power, such as when one state uses its armed forces to undertake humanitarian relief operations on behalf of another, this is not usually the case. For the most part, a state's soft power springs from three autonomous, largely ideational bases: culture, political values, and foreign policy legitimacy.[5] In recent years, Nye has coined and discussed the concept of smart power, which he defines as 'the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies.'[6] Depending on the particular policy context, hard and soft power can either reinforce or undercut each other, and therefore the foreign policy behavior of policymakers can be evaluated by scholars according to how effectively they conjoin the two forms of power depending on the context at hand.[7]

Nye's Cursory Discussion of Power and Alliance Behavior

The concepts of hard power, soft power, and smart power can be insightfully applied to the consequential domain of wartime alliance management, but their progenitor provides scant guidance on the matter. Nye only briefly touches on the topic of military alliance behavior, claiming merely that the US should, whenever possible, pursue its strategic aims multilaterally by working through the formal network of alliances and security commitments that Washington has laboriously constructed over the course of the post-World War II era. This network acts as a force multiplier, by 'increasing legitimacy and burden sharing, by facilitating consultation and interoperability, and by helping to address unforeseen challenges without the start-up costs of [ad hoc] coalition building.'

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[3]Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 'Power and Foreign Policy,' *Journal of Political Power* 4/1 (2011), 16.
[4]Ibid., 20–1.
[5]Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs 2011), 84.
[6]Ibid., 22–3.
[7]Nye, 'Power and Foreign Policy,' 20.

Nye adds that alliances dampen the likelihood of bandwagoning or balancing against the US.[8]

This rather cursory discussion elides the particular circumstances and challenges associated with wartime alliance management. The most important context in which alliances function is that of wartime, when the stakes associated with their performance are highest and the costs associated with dysfunction are steepest. This places a premium on the construction of policy relevant knowledge that reveals the range of conditions under which a wartime alliance leader will be more likely to successfully recruit, retain, and elicit cooperation from partners.

Adapting Nye's Concept of Soft Power to the Context of Wartime Alliance Management

Nye's tripartite conceptualization of power can be usefully applied to the analysis of wartime alliance management, but must be modified to take into account the uniquely exigent conditions that confront states in that context. In particular, the calculations of states contemplating involvement or continued involvement in war can be expected to be dominated by the salient risks and potentially grave implications that are inexorably associated with armed conflict.[9] The endemic risks associated with war are most clearly demonstrated by the recurrent historical phenomenon of militarily powerful states losing wars to much weaker opponents.[10] Consequently, an alliance leader's soft power, or its ability to secure voluntary and enthusiastic cooperation from actual and prospective partners, will not hinge on Nye's presumed three bases of soft power, namely, the leader's culture, political values, and foreign policy legitimacy. These bases will only be relevant in a peacetime context. Rather, soft power in the form of positive attraction will derive primarily from two material factors directly stemming from

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[8]*CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007), 32. Nye's blanket assertion that the US should routinely favor standing alliances over ad hoc coalitions is not addressed in this article, but has been disputed elsewhere. See Sarah E. Kreps, *Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War* (New York: OUP 2011); and Weitsman, *Waging War.*

[9]According to James Fearon, 'war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war.' James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War,' *International Organization* 49/3 (Summer 1995), 380.

[10]Andrew Mack, 'Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,' *World Politics* 27/2 (Jan. 1975), 175–200; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: CUP 2005).

the conflict that are largely beyond the ability of policymakers to directly manipulate. These are the magnitude of the threat posed by the adversary and the amount of relative military power possessed by the alliance leader.[11] The more important of the two is the level of threat posed to an actual or potential ally by a wartime adversary.[12] If such a state is gravely threatened by the adversary, it will be highly motivated to seek out allies to help confront and defeat it, and will itself possess soft power vis-à-vis other threatened states. The state(s) that will be the most alluring in this regard is that which possesses the most military power and is therefore most capable of defeating the adversary.[13]

The irrelevance of Nye's three soft power bases of culture, values, and foreign policy legitimacy to the imperatives of wartime statecraft is most clearly evidenced by the frequent recourse by states to form 'alliances of convenience.' As Stephen Walt relates, when states have been faced with great dangers, they have prudently sought 'whatever allies they can get,' even if those allies espouse divergent domestic political ideologies and possess otherwise discordant geopolitical interests.[14] To wit, both President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill explicitly referred to their archetypal alliance of convenience with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union during World War II as a pact with 'the devil.'[15] Prior to Nazi Germany's June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, both the US and Britain had

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[11]To some degree, a state's military power is manipulable during wartime insofar as its political leadership is able to expeditiously convert the country's economic power (or latent military power) into (actual) military power. On this distinction, see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, updated ed. (New York: Norton 2014), Ch. 3 (55–82).

[12]Stephen Walt conceptualizes threat as a compound variable consisting of four elements: aggregate capabilities (i.e., power), geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1987), 21–6.

[13]Nye does note that one of the functions of military power is to provide 'protection' to other states and that this can be a source of soft power, but he proceeds to exclusively discuss this modality in the context of peacetime relations between states. Nye, *The Future of Power*, 45–7.

[14]Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 38; Evan N. Resnick, 'Strange Bedfellows? US Bargaining Behavior with Allies of Convenience,' *International Security* 35/3 (Winter 2010/11), 147.

[15]See Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War,* Vol. 3: *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1950), 370–1; and '[Letter from] Roosevelt to Churchill, No. 219, November 19, 1942,' in Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas (eds), *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence* (New York: E.P. Dutton 1975) Doc. 185, p. 282.

completely estranged themselves from Stalin's regime, which not only practiced communist totalitarianism at home, but also promoted communist revolution abroad and had even betrayed the Western powers by signing a non-aggression treaty with the Third Reich less than two years earlier. Hitler's defiance of that agreement and the Soviet Red Army's stubborn refusal to break in the face of the Wehrmacht's massive onslaught persuaded Roosevelt to open the floodgates of large-scale military assistance to the USSR and to subsequently form the Grand Alliance with Stalin (and Churchill) following America's formal entry into the war.[16] This case also demonstrates that although it is possible for a state to generate soft power even vis-à-vis a bitter ideological and geopolitical adversary, this will only likely occur if the shared threat is immense and the state's war-winning power is substantial.

Importantly, several alliances have been created not in response to threat, but rather, opportunity. Whereas status quo states have formed balancing alliances to counter rising threats, revisionist states have formed bandwagoning alliances in pursuit of territorial, economic, and other spoils.[17] In his path-breaking treatment of the concept of bandwagoning, Randall Schweller distinguishes between unlimited aims revisionist states and limited aims revisionists. The former, which Schweller labels wolves, are great powers that aim to conquer the world or much of it, while the latter, which he designates as jackals, are weaker powers that eagerly link up with wolves to consume the scraps they leave behind in their wake.[18] When a wolf leads a wartime alliance, it will possess soft power vis-à-vis jackals to the degree that both the magnitude of potential gains from the war and the military capabilities of the wolf are both perceived by the jackals as being high. Conversely, if the prospective gains are paltry and the wolf is relatively weak, the wolf's ability to attract jackals to its side will be minimal.

Research on prospect theory in the discipline of cognitive psychology suggests that great power leaders of defensive alliances, which Schweller refers to as lions, will generally possess greater soft power than their wolfish counterparts. Prospect theory hypothesizes that individuals tend to 'frame' choice dilemmas around a concrete reference point and are more likely to take risks if they perceive themselves to be in the domain

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[16]McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia.*
[17]Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,' *International Security* 19/1 (Summer 1994), 104–5.
[18]Ibid., 103–4.

of loss as opposed to gain vis-à-vis the reference point.[19] As previously mentioned, the decision to enter a war is highly risky under even the most promising of circumstances. If, as psychological research has indicated, loss aversion is a widely applicable cognitive bias, policymakers will be more inclined to accept these risks for the sake of preventing losses of values important to them (i.e., territory, wealth, prestige, military security), than for the sake of gaining additional values. Thus, other things being equal, alliance leaders that are fighting a defensive war against an aggressor should be more attractive to prospective or actual allies than revisionist leaders waging a war of aggression.[20]

By contrast with the more salient soft power sources of threat (or opportunity) and military power, a third, subsidiary source of wartime soft power is agentic and thereby amenable to manipulation. An alliance leader can further enhance its attractiveness to allies by providing them with voice opportunities regarding the strategic and operational direction of the war and the aim(s) for which the war is being waged.[21] This source will be most robustly exploited if the senior partner establishes formal institutions and/or informal processes that not only enable the various allied leaders, their military staffs, and other delegates to coordinate ends and means on a regular basis but also to engage in agenda-setting and persuasion, which, according to Nye, also constitute mechanisms by which soft power may be wielded.[22] Of course these institutions and processes will also enable the leader's partners to similarly engage in agenda-setting and persuasion towards it.

The emblematic example of this behavior was President Roosevelt's decision to form the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) organization during World War II. The CCS was a standing committee comprising the most senior staff officers of the US (the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Britain (The Chiefs of Staff). It was tasked with advising Roosevelt and Churchill on strategic matters and supervising the execution of the

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[19]The seminal work on prospect theory is Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,' *Econometrica* 47 (1979), 263–91. On the application of the theory to foreign policy decisionmaking, see Jack S. Levy, 'Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making,' in Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (New York: OUP 2013), 314–16.

[20]For a useful discussion of the differences between risk-acceptant and risk-averse revisionist great powers, which includes several empirical examples of each type, see Randall L. Schweller, 'Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,' in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (New York: Routledge 1999), 21–3.

[21]Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty – Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1970).

[22]Nye, *The Future of Power*, 93.

strategy agreed upon by the two leaders, who were in near constant contact throughout the war. The president also agreed to the creation of a dense network of joint boards and committees to facilitate the bilateral sharing of intelligence, allocation of munitions, and coordination of the transfer and shipping of food and raw materials. These institutions not only bolstered British confidence in the alliance by providing its civil and military leaders with extensive opportunities to convey their preferences on strategic and operational matters, but it also enabled both US and British officials to engage in mutual persuasion and agenda-setting.[23]

Democracies possess an inherent advantage over autocracies insofar as this source of soft power is concerned. Since democratic regimes exhibit 'a publicly accepted formula for power transfers and political change and … strong civil societies,'[24] they are minimally susceptible to popular insurrections and military coups. They will thereby permit the relatively free flow of information throughout their polities and will be inclined to adopt delegative command systems in war, which grant military officers considerable decisionmaking autonomy. Since democratic regimes subscribe to the norm of providing extensive voice opportunities to their own citizens, officials, and officers, they are also more likely to provide them to the representatives of allied states. By contrast, since autocratic regimes lack a publicly accepted formula for power transfers and political change, and typically rule over weak civil societies, they are highly susceptible to insurrections and coups. To mitigate these risks, autocrats typically impose tight constraints on the flow of information throughout their polities and institute assertive systems of command and control that tightly restrict the decisionmaking autonomy of military officers.[25] It follows that since autocrats are strongly averse to providing voice opportunities to their own citizens, officials, and officers, they will also likely be averse to providing such opportunities to the representatives of allied states.

Unlimited aims revisionist powers (wolves) will also be disinclined to provide voice opportunities to allies. By definition, wolves hold war-aims that negate the ambitions of all other actors, including allies. As Schweller relates, the roster of unlimited aims revisionists in modern

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[23]The CCC's headquarters was located in Washington DC, which arguably afforded the US an upper hand over Britain in terms of agenda-setting and persuasion. Mark A. Stoler, *Allies in War: Britain and America Against the Axis Powers 1940–1945* (London: Hodder Arnold 2005), 43–7.
[24]Ulrich Pilster, 'Are Democracies the Better Allies? The Impact of Regime Type on Military Coalition Operations,' *International Interactions* 37/1 (Jan.–March 2011), 59.
[25]Pilster, 'Are Democracies the Better Allies?', 58–60; Gordon Tullock, *Autocracy* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1987), 24; Charles Lipson, *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Made a Separate Peace* (Princeton UP 2003), 87.

international history, which includes Alexander the Great, the Arabs during the seventh and eighth centuries, Charles V, Philip II, Frederick the Great, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and Hitler, 'all lusted for universal empire and waged all-or-nothing, apocalyptic wars to attain it.'[26] The achievement of such states' ultimate ends can only be achieved through the effective annihilation or subjugation of all other states, both friends and foes.[27] The complete incommensurability of the long-term war-aims of wolves and their allies should therefore also weaken the motivation of wolfish leaders' to establish regular channels of intra-alliance coordination and consultation.

Although this base of soft power lies within the control of policy-makers, it should be considerably weaker than the previous two sources. Again, logic imparts that states will be loathe to incur the inevitable risks and costs associated with armed conflict in the absence of a significant threat to their national security (or, in the case of revisionists, the opportunity to significantly expand their power) and/or if the alliance leader is militarily weak, even if the leader affords its partners extensive opportunities to communicate their preferences. This agentic source of soft power should therefore be viewed by alliance leaders as a supplement to reinforce the more salient systemic sources.

Hard Power Strategies of Alliance Management

The optimal degree of coerciveness associated with the hard power resources deployed by an alliance leader should vary inversely with the amount of soft power that it enjoys vis-à-vis its extant and prospective partners. A leader that enjoys considerable soft power should deploy hard power on a minimally coercive basis. Conversely, a leader that possesses a negative amount of soft power (i.e., one that is perceived by other states not merely as unattractive, but downright repulsive) must wield hard power in a highly coercive manner to obtain allied cooperation.

While the soft power and hard power components of smart power should vary in a roughly inverse manner, they will not be equal in potency. As discussed by Giulio Galarotti, soft power resources are typically x-efficient whereas hard power resources are x-inefficient:

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[26]Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit,' 104.

[27]To wit, Jonathan Adelman notes that during World War II, Nazi Germany's foremost allies were right-wing dictatorships 'which shared some features of the German world view but rejected its core of a radical transcendent restructuring of the world with Germany as the dominant power.' Jonathan R. Adelman, 'Introduction,' in Jonathan R. Adelman (ed.), *Hitler and his Allies in World War II* (New York: Routledge 2007), 19.

With regard to voluntary compliance with the preferences of soft power nations, because such compliance is largely self-motivated, we can expect such compliance to be carried out at a higher level of intensity than compliance coerced [or induced] by hard power methods against the will of the target nations (target nations will have every incentive to carry out coerced compliance in the most lax manner possible without incurring the wrath of the coercing nation.[28]

For this reason, soft power is not only less costly than hard power, it is also more effective.

I identify four generic hard power strategies from which an alliance leader may select, depending on the relative amount of soft power it holds vis-à-vis prospective and incumbent partners (see Figure 1). Logically, a given alliance leader's attractiveness to other states can vary from –1 or extreme repulsion to +1 or extreme attraction. This implies that a state that is thoroughly repulsed by the alliance leader will be at least somewhat attracted to the alliance leader's adversary.

First, an alliance leader that seeks to court a state that is highly repulsed by it possesses a negative amount of soft power, and thereby must pursue a confrontational strategy towards the desired state that I dub *coercive enticement*. If the repulsed state is not participating in the war as a belligerent against the alliance leader, coercive enticement will consist of the threat or use of force by the leader against that state to persuade it to join the leader's side in the war. If the repulsed state is actively participating in the war against the leader, a coercive enticement strategy will involve the leader's threat or use of escalated or focused force against the repulsed state unless it switches sides. The strategy is most likely to succeed if the balance of military power between the alliance leader (and its allies) significantly exceed that of the state it is coercing.[29]


Figure 1. Four Hard Power Strategies of Wartime Alliance Management.

[28]Giulio M. Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism* (New York: CUP 2010), 51.
[29]Timothy W. Crawford, 'Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,' *International Security* 35/4 (Spring 2011), 156, 158, 159–64. Although Crawford is generally sceptical about the prospects of purely coercive 'wedge strategies'

The United States employed coercive enticement against Pakistan in the immediate wake of the Al-Qa'eda terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Following the failure of the George W. Bush administration to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to sever its relationship with Al-Qa'eda, dismantle the group's infrastructure, and hand its leaders over to Washington, the White House resolved to conduct military operations in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban from power and decimate Al-Qa'eda. It proceeded to seek the support of neighboring Pakistan, which was one of the Taliban's few international allies.[30]

By the time of the 9/11 attacks, US relations with Pakistan were quite hostile. Although the two states had cooperated closely during the 1980s to counter the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, soon after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 the US Congress suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan on account of Islamabad's continued efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Bilateral relations further deteriorated after Pakistan tested a nuclear weapon in 1998, launched a military skirmish against India in May 1999, and later that year experienced a military coup. Meanwhile, over the course of the decade, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) provided the Taliban with supplies, logistical support, and training, which facilitated their conquest of most of Afghanistan by September 2001.[31]

The increasingly acrimonious tenor of the relationship between Washington and Islamabad set the stage for the Bush administration's resort to coercive enticement vis-à-vis Pakistan's strongman, General Pervez Musharraf, after 9/11. According to Musharraf, in the immediate aftermath of the attack, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage bluntly warned Pakistan's intelligence director that if Islamabad did not switch sides, 'Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.' In response, Musharraf acquiesced to the Bush administration's demands that he cease all support for the Taliban and permit US overflights of Pakistani territory.[32]

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aimed at severing adversary alliances, Yasuhiro Izumikawa is more sanguine about their utility. See Ibid., 160–64; and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, 'To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics,' *Security Studies* 22/3 (2013), 498–531.

[30]Martha Crenshaw, 'Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism,' in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (eds), *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2003), 335–42.

[31]Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2001), 256–358.

[32]Suzanne Goldenberg, 'Bush Threatened to Bomb Pakistan, Says Musharraf,' *The Guardian*, 21 Sept. 2006, <www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/22/pakistan.usa>. Within days, however, the Bush administration shifted to a strategy of side-payment bribery towards Islamabad. After successfully lobbying Congress to rescind its nuclear sanctions against Pakistan, the administration began providing large-scale military aid

Second, an alliance leader that tries to engender cooperation from a state that is indifferent towards it should pursue a hard power strategy of *side-payment bribery*. In such situations, the target is neither strongly inclined nor disinclined to participate in the alliance and therefore must be cajoled into participating through the conditional provision of material inducements that are not directly related to the ongoing war. Since the target state has little at stake in the war, the expected costs of its entry and continued involvement must be offset by benefits in other issue-areas.[33]

The Bush administration engaged in extensive side payment bribery in order to enlist various states in its 'coalition of the willing' which invaded Iraq in March 2003. Since many states did not share the administration's belief that Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a serious threat to international peace and security, the White House attempted to secure their involvement in the war with a diverse array of side-payments. In this effort, the administration was also hindered by the invasion's perceived lack of legitimacy. The US failure to secure passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq contributed significantly to the war's global unpopularity, which further complicated the US effort to recruit allies.[34] To cite just one of several examples, in exchange for the Mongolian government's accession to the alliance, the administration agreed to schedule a formal visit by President Bush to Mongolia and negotiate a US-Mongolia free trade treaty.[35]

The potential effectiveness of side-payments is likely to be limited, however, for two reasons. First, since war is an ineluctably costly and risky venture for all participants, prospective or actual allies that are not highly motivated to fight because the adversary is minimally threatening or because the alliance leader is weak, or both, will typically demand extensive side-payments in order to offset the expected costs and risks of fighting. Second, if the threat posed by the adversary is low, the alliance leader will also be reluctant to meet the steep demands issued by the prospective or actual ally, and if the alliance leader is weak, it will be incapable of meeting them.

The relative inefficacy of side-payment bribery was evinced in March 2003, when Turkey's Grand National Assembly narrowly rejected a

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to the Musharraf regime, which totaled upwards of $8 billion by the time the Pakistani leader stopped down in 2008. Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2011), 72.

[33]If the amount of soft power possessed by the alliance leader lies somewhere between –1 and 0, a mixed strategy of coercion and bribery will be preferable.

[34]Weitsman, *Waging War*, 156–61.

[35]Ibid., 141–2. The administration also promised its coalition partners that it would provide them with both subsidies and contracts to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure after the war.

resolution that would have permitted the United States to use Turkish territory to conduct the invasion of Iraq.[36] In order to secure Turkey's acquiescence, the Bush administration had offered it $2 billion in military aid and $4 billion in economic assistance. It also agreed to provide Ankara with a 'bridge loan' of $8.5 billion.[37] The generosity of the US offer nevertheless failed to sway the newly elected Justice and Development Party (AKP), which held a majority in the Assembly. Not only did the AKP leaders (as well as Turkey's military) view Saddam Hussein's Iraq as a minor threat to Turkish security, but they also feared that a war against Iraq would retard Turkey's recovery from its worst recession in five decades and fan the flames of Kurdish separatism. In addition, Turkish public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to participating in a US-led war against Iraq, by a staggering margin of 83–13.[38] Meanwhile, although US officials were eager to open a (northern) Turkish front for the invasion of Iraq to complement the primary (southern) front in Kuwait, they did not perceive it as being necessary for the invasion's success, which tempered the magnitude of the inducements they were willing to offer the AKP.[39]

Alliance leaders that possess a positive amount of soft power will be most likely to employ the hard power strategies of *conditional* or *unconditional war-effort bolstering*. If a prospective or incumbent ally is already motivated to participate in a war against the adversary, the leader will not have to deploy material rewards unrelated to the war-effort in order to secure its cooperation. Rather, the leader can deliver subvention, on either a conditional or unconditional basis, which enhances the ally's fighting power. Such inducements include the transfer of war materiel, strategic natural resources, intelligence, money, and even combat units to the ally. Bolstering will be more effectively undertaken on a conditional basis if the recipient is highly motivated to fight the adversary but holds preferences

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[36]Carol Migdalovitz, *Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of US Forces, and Related Issues*, Congressional Research Service Report RL31794, 2 May 2003. Obtained from Wikileaks Document Release, <http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL31794>, 13.

[37]Ibid., 15.

[38]Ibid., 5–11. Notably, within days of the commencement of the invasion, Turkey agreed to much scaled-down US requests for access to Turkish airspace, the provision of food, fuel, and other non-lethal supplies to US troops in northern Iraq, and Turkey's pledge not to enter northern Iraq. In return, the Bush administration agreed to provide Turkey with $1 billion in economic aid, which it could use to leverage an additional $8.5 billion in private loans (21–2).

[39]To wit, in the several months leading up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell did not pay a single visit to Turkey and instead delegated negotiations with Ankara to a subordinate who had little experience in Turkey. Michael Rubin, 'A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War,' *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 4/1 (Spring 2005), 3–4.

that significantly diverge from those of the leader on the conduct and aims of the war.[40] In this way, the leader can exploit the asymmetry of capabilities between itself and the recipient to manipulate the recipient's preferences. If the recipient broadly shares the leader's preferences on the conduct and aims of the war, then the leader does not have to attach behavioral conditions to its subvention in order to promote cohesion.

Both types of bolstering were employed by the Roosevelt administration during World War II under the aegis of the Lend-Lease program of allied military assistance, which played a crucial role in the eventual victory of the Grand Alliance. After the program was passed by Congress in March 1941, Lend-Lease aid was subsequently dispatched to no fewer than 38 allied countries, in the form of aircraft, weapons, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, foodstuffs, and raw materials, worth a total value of $50 billion. The largest recipients were Britain ($30 billion) and the Soviet Union ($10.6 billion).[41]

For most of the war, the White House dispatched Lend-Lease aid to its foremost allies of Britain and the USSR on an unconditional basis, but during the conflict's waning months, it began attaching explicit behavioral conditions to continued assistance. This reflected growing divisions between the US and both of its great power allies regarding war-aims and growing suspicions in Washington regarding their geopolitical ambitions. In late 1944, Roosevelt admonished British leaders that they would not receive bridging aid during the interregnum between the impending defeat of Germany and subsequent defeat of Japan unless London both suspended trade negotiations with the Argentine regime of Edelmiro Farrell – which the administration suspected of harboring pro-Nazi sympathies – and ceased obstructing US proposals on a postwar civil aviation regime.[42] Meanwhile, three days

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[40]For states that are weakly motivated to fight, the alliance leader may have to resort to both side-payment bribes and conditional bolstering. For example, during the 2003–11 Iraq War, the Bush administration not only agreed to issue a security guarantee to Poland and station ballistic missile defense batteries on Polish soil (i.e. side-payment bribery), but also transferred $240 million to the Polish government to support its forces in Iraq (i.e. bolstering). Weitsman, *Waging War*, 141.

[41]R.G.D. Allen, 'Mutual Aid Between the US and the British Empire,' *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 109/33 (1946), 250. Apart from Lend-Lease, the administration engaged in intensive intelligence-sharing with the British and, to a lesser extent, the Soviets. See Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: Norton 1995), 219–20.

[42]President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill), telegram, 18 Nov. 1944, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. 7: The American Republics* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1967), 365; President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), telegram, 24 Nov. 1944, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. 2: General Economic and Social Matters* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1969), 589.

after Germany's surrender in May 1945, Roosevelt's successor Harry S. Truman stipulated that future supply shipments to the USSR would only be approved if Moscow provided 'reasonably adequate information regarding their essentiality.'[43] Two months later, the US State Department abandoned its previous passivity in response to the Soviet practice of retransferring its Lend-Lease supplies to third countries by threatening to cease shipping any items that Moscow retransferred in the future.[44] The Lend-Lease case imparts that as the military fortunes of an alliance improve, the diminishing external threat depletes the soft power of the alliance leader, thereby necessitating its greater reliance on the conditional use of hard power.

A Typology of Alliance Leadership Failure

Alliance leaders can be expected to vary widely in the extent to which they effectively apprehend and exploit opportunities to wield soft power, and supplement their soft power with the requisite types and amounts of hard power. In order to maximize their wartime soft power, above all, policymakers need to be able to accurately assess not only the level of threat posed by the adversary towards itself and others, but also the magnitude of its own power relative to that of the adversary. These tasks are extremely difficult to execute effectively, however, for several reasons. First, the international system is an extremely complex and ambiguous information-rich environment characterized by a multitude of actors and variables.[45] Second, the process of assaying power and threat is also burdened by the absence of objective and reliable indices for accurately measuring either concept.[46] Third, during wartime, states also routinely project deceptive images of their intentions and

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[43]Acting Secretary of State and the Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley to President Truman, memorandum, 11 May 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. 5: Europe* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1967), 999–1000.

[44]George C. Herring, Jr, *Aid to Russia 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia UP 1973), 229–30.

[45]Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton UP 1976), 31.

[46]Richard Ned Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,' in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia UP 1996), 26–33; R. Harrison Wagner, 'What Was Bipolarity?', *International Organization* 47/1 (Winter 1993), 77–106; Keren Yarhi-Milo, 'In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,' *International Security* 38/1 (Summer 2013), 7–51.

capabilities towards both friends and foes in order to maximize their narrow self-interests.[47] Fourth, decisionmakers are prone to various cognitive biases, which leads them to frequently misperceive the actions and motivations of other actors in the international system.[48] In addition, as discussed above, democratic and status-quo-oriented great powers should be more disposed to grant voice opportunities to allies than autocratic and revisionist ones.

Meanwhile, in order to deploy hard power, senior executive branch decisionmakers must possess sufficient 'state strength' to extract domestic resources for delivery to needy allies. In addition, decisionmakers must possess the autonomy to both affix necessary and prudent conditions to the delivery of those resources and prevent unnecessary and imprudent conditions from being affixed to their delivery by other domestic political actors. Since states very along a wide continuum of strength, some will be prove more capable than others of precisely modulating hard power deliveries to alliance partners.[49]

Alliance leaders can fail to exercise smart power in three ways, as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. A Smart Power Typology of Alliance Leadership Failure

Type of Alliance Leadership Failure	Hard Power	Soft Power	Illustrative Example
malign neglect	in possession but insufficiently exploited	in possession but insufficiently exploited	US relationship with NATO allies during initial phase of the war in Afghanistan, Oct. 2001-early 2002
heavy-handedness	deployed in excess	in possession but insufficiently exploited	US relationship with Soviet Union and Britain during final months of World War II, May–August 1945
light-handedness	in possession, but insufficiently exploited	overestimated	US relationship with Britain and Pakistan during Vietnam War, 1964–66

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[47]Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York: Columbia UP 1989).

[48]Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*.

[49]Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, Investments, and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton UP 1978).

The first type of failure, which I refer to as *malign neglect*, occurs if the leader deploys insufficient amounts of both hard and soft power towards prospective or incumbent allies. Neglect will be most likely to occur during wars in which the alliance leader is highly confident that robust allied support is unnecessary to achieve victory at an acceptable cost and/or that the short-term threat posed to it by the adversary places a premium on the expedient execution of military operations, which is far easier to do on a unilateral basis than a multilateral one.[50] Neglect can only be judged a 'failure' to exercise smart power in a particular instance if either or both of these calculations by the alliance leader prove to be inaccurate.

A contemporary example of malign neglect was the George W. Bush administration's lack of cooperation with America's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the immediate wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The shocking severity of the attacks prompted a massive 'outpouring of international support [on America's behalf],'[51] and elicited widespread fears of follow-on attacks against the US and its allies. This support was reflected in the United Nations Security Council's unanimous condemnation of the attacks and explicit acknowledgement of the United States' 'right of individual or collective self-defense' as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.[52] In addition, the North Atlantic Council took the historically unprecedented step of unanimously invoking Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which holds that all members 'agree that an armed attack against one or more of them … shall be considered an attack against them all.'[53]

As the Bush administration prepared to initiate military operations against Al-Qa'eda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan, it mostly spurned allied offers of military assistance. Rather than integrate NATO special operations and other military forces into its Afghanistan campaign, the administration merely agreed to symbolically deploy NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft within the United States as part of its homeland security

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[50]Sarah Kreps, 'When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan,' *Security Studies* 17 (2008), 531–67.

[51]Ibid., 532.

[52]Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution #1368, adopted 12 Sept. 2001, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement>.

[53]Text of North Atlantic Treaty, signed 9 April 1949, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>.

operation.[54] This move generated considerable allied resentment. According to Nora Bensahel,

> many Europeans were dissatisfied with the small role that the alliance played in the response to the September 11 attacks and attributed it to US unilateralism and arrogance. While they understood the need to ensure effective command and control, they felt that they had given the United States unconditional political support through the invocation of Article 5 and that they should at least be consulted about the direction of the military campaign.[55]

The only allied state which the White House permitted to take part in military operations in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, was itself minimally involved in the early stages of the conflict. Although some special operations forces from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Poland, Turkey, and Germany were later included in the campaign, they were not deployed until several months after the November 2001 collapse of the Taliban and were not integrated into US war plans.[56] This exclusionary behavior was attributable to senior Bush administration officials' belief that the war could be won relatively easily without significant allied involvement. In addition, officials were understandably wary of the cumbersome command and control arrangements that would be activated in the event of NATO involvement, especially in light of NATO's chaotically managed 1999 air war against Serbia.[57]

The administration's decision to marginalize NATO at the outset of the Afghanistan War was problematic, however, in at least two respects. First, in late 2001 the US experienced tremendous difficulties in preventing the escape of Al-Qa'eda and Taliban forces from Afghanistan into neighboring Pakistan and White House officials overestimated the capabilities and resolve of indigenous Afghan forces. The inclusion of NATO special operations forces earlier in the fight might have therefore more effectively helped thwart the exfiltration of enemy fighters and their overseers, particularly Al-Qa'eda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and Taliban leader Mullah Muhammed Omar.[58]

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[54]Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2003), 8–9.
[55]Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions*, 16–17.
[56]Kreps, 'When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition?', 542–4.
[57]Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions*, 16.
[58]Weitsman, *Waging War*, 122–123.

Second, as the war to depose the Taliban wore down, the administration reversed course and began to solicit allied intervention under the aegis of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was created in December 2001 for the purpose of helping to stabilize the interim Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai. In August 2003, NATO formally assumed command of the mission, which until 2009 operated under a different mandate and a distinct authority from Operation 'Enduring Freedom', the US-dominated military campaign in Afghanistan.[59] Since its inception, however, ISAF's cohesion and performance have been vitiated by pitched 'disagreements over burden sharing, caveats, and troop levels.'[60] To the degree that the Bush administration's malign neglect of NATO in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 alienated those same allies that were later beseeched repeatedly by the White House to contribute to the follow-on ISAF mission, the early decision could be construed to have been a smart power failure.

The second type of failure, *heavy-handedness*, occurs when the alliance leader insufficiently exploits its available soft power. Consequently, it errs by deploying excessive amounts of coercive hard power towards prospective or incumbent allies, or it offers material inducements to them on an exceedingly stringent basis, resulting in their unnecessary disaffection.

Heavy-handedness was evident in the final phase of the otherwise extremely successful US Lend-Lease program during World War II that was discussed above. Although the diminishing threat posed by the Axis powers in early 1945 warranted a prudent shift from the unconditional to conditional provision of war materiel to the British and Soviets, the Truman administration needlessly strained relations with both allies as a result of the peremptory manner in which it terminated the program. With regard to the Soviet Union, on 11 May 1945 Truman signed a directive stipulating that Soviet requests for additional aid should only be considered 'on the basis of reasonably accurate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet military supply requirements and in light of the competing demands for supplies in the changing military situation.'[61] Consequently, the Foreign Economic Administration, which was responsible for the program's implementation, overreacted by immediately halting the loading of Lend-Lease supplies on ships in US ports and even instructing supply ships that were already en route to

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[59]Ibid., 99–131; David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (Princeton UP 2014).
[60]Ibid., 123.
[61]Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State and the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to President Truman, 11 May 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. 5: Europe*, 1000.

the Soviet Union to return to the US According to historian George Herring this constituted a 'serious diplomatic blunder,' as '[t]he abruptness of the change shocked and angered the Russians, and although Truman later modified his order, the handling of Lend-Lease marks an important milestone in the transition from wartime alliance to Cold War enmity.'[62]

The administration's draconian aid policy towards Britain during the final months of the war was no less self-defeating. In the immediate wake of Germany's 7 May 1945 surrender to the Allies, Truman directed the US Army to repossess most of the aid that had already been scheduled to be transferred to British forces in Europe. Then, in response to Truman's announcement on 5 July that all future Lend-Lease aid would be restricted to those items that were to be 'used in the war against Japan,' the War Department forbade the provision of any new supplies for British occupation troops in Europe, even though these forces usefully enabled the US Army to redeploy its own troops from Europe to the Pacific.[63] Finally, on 21 August, the White House unexpectedly terminated the Lend-Lease program, prompting a shocked Churchill to publicly condemn the decision in the House of Commons as 'rough and harsh.'[64] Truman would later claim that the sudden cutoff of Lend-Lease to Britain represented the greatest mistake of his presidency.[65]

The third type of wartime alliance management failure, *light-handedness*, depicts situations in which the alliance leader overestimates its available soft power and consequently deploys insufficient hard power to elicit allied cooperation. Light-handedness becomes possible if prospective or incumbent allies are not voluntarily disposed to cooperate closely with the leader because the threat posed by the adversary is low, the leader is militarily weak, or the leader refrains from providing voice opportunities to its partners. In such circumstances, the alliance will fragment or will be stillborn if the leader refrains from consequently offering up enough material inducements, attaching sufficiently stringent conditions to these material inducements, or threatening to punish non-cooperation.

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[62]Herring, *Aid to Russia 1941–1946*, 181, 206.

[63]Robert M. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947* (New York: Columbia UP 1981), 145–7.

[64]Quoted in Ibid. Truman's actions amounted to a betrayal of Roosevelt's earlier pledge to Churchill that Lend-Lease aid would continue to flow during the interregnum between the defeat of Germany and subsequent defeat of Japan. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership*, 65–6.

[65]Herring, *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946*, 236.

Light-handedness was evident in President Lyndon B. Johnson's efforts to generate allied involvement in the US war in Vietnam. In an April 1964 press conference, Johnson proclaimed that 'we would like to see some other flags [in South Vietnam],'[66] to help the United States stanch the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. The administration sought to portray the war as a collective security operation undertaken by the regional Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance, which had formed in 1954. Of SEATO's seven members, however, only four – the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines – were actually participating in the war, while the remaining three – Britain, France, and Pakistan – were not. Whereas France was considered a lost cause owing to the vociferousness with which French President Charles De Gaulle criticized US policy in Vietnam, Britain and Pakistan were considered by the White House to be viable contributors.[67]

Although Johnson was especially eager to enlist Britain because it was both a member of NATO and SEATO, he relied exclusively on moral suasion in his appeals to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, stressing Britain's legal obligation as a member of SEATO to enter the war.[68] He rejected suggestions by White House advisors in mid-1965 that the US condition its continued provision of support to the British pound sterling – which had endured a succession of crises since 1945 – to a British troop deployment to Vietnam. National Security Advisor MacGeorge Bundy fruitlessly insisted to Johnson that 'a British brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for sterling.' Two years later, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 'rather wryly [claimed] …that he did think we could help the British with their financial troubles if only "they put forces into Vietnam".'[69] Once again, Johnson demurred, fearing that if US coercion of its closest ally became public knowledge it would provoke a public outcry. Johnson also feared that if the White House made good on its threat to abandon the pound, a run on the pound would in turn lead to an attack on the dollar.[70]

The White House similarly demurred from expending sufficient hard power resources to secure Pakistani military intervention in Vietnam. In a July 1964 meeting between Johnson and Pakistan's US ambassador, Ghulum Ahmed, the president declared that he 'had been shocked by

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[66]Quoted in Jonathan Colman and J.J. Widen, 'The Johnson Administration and the Recruitment of Allies in Vietnam, 1964–1968,' *History* 94/316 (Oct. 2009), 484.
[67]Ibid., 485–90.
[68]Ibid., 492.
[69]Quoted in Ibid., 496.
[70]Ibid., 497.

[Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan's] silence [on Vietnam],' and accused Pakistan of 'ignor[ing] its alliance obligations.'[71] In response, Ayub merely offered to dispatch 5,000 civilians to Vietnam, in return for an undisclosed price that was judged by Defense Secretary Clark Clifford to be 'exorbitant' and by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Burton Wheeler to be 'too high.'[72]

Conclusion

In this paper I have appropriated Joseph Nye's concept of smart power to devise an analytical framework for assessing the wartime management of military alliances, empirically focusing on alliances spearheaded by the United States. To this end I proposed that three discrete bases of soft power predominate during a wartime context and that the coerciveness with which an alliance leader deploys hard power towards its partners should vary inversely with the amount of soft power that it possesses. I proceeded to identify four hard power strategies for alliance management and establish a threefold typology of alliance management failure.

Admittedly, this framework merely represents a preliminary effort to apply a still incipient research program on smart power into the relatively uncharted intellectual territory of wartime alliance behavior. The various premises and propositions that undergird the framework thereby require more systematic testing. Even so, however, it is difficult to resist at least preliminarily speculating about two of the framework's possible implications for current US national security policy.

First, in the unfortunate event that the US finds itself at war with a future adversary, it will possess a larger reservoir of soft power vis-à-vis its allies if it practices a grand strategy of offshore balancing as opposed to one of primacy or deep engagement, which it has pursued since the end of the Cold War. The chief difference between offshore balancing and primacy is that the former minimally entails a withdrawal of forward-deployed US troops from their bases in allied states and maximally necessitates the abrogation of America's standing alliances.[73]

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[71]Quoted in Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, 151.

[72]Notes of Meeting, 19 June 1968, Document 276, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968: Vol. 6, Vietnam, Jan.–Aug. 1968* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 2002).

[73]On offshore balancing, see for example, Christopher Layne, 'From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,' *International Security* 22/1 (Sept. 1997), 1–39; Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2014); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Imperial By Design,' *The National Interest*, No. 111 (Jan./Feb. 2011), 16–34; and Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy* (New York: Norton 2005).

Offshore balancing is premised on the belief that the United States' chief national security interests are the defense of its sovereign territory and the maintenance of a balance of power in the three regions that are most strategically important to the US, namely, Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf.[74] The most cost-effective and prudent way to achieve these ends is to rely on local actors to do the heavy lifting of countering the rise of potential regional hegemons, while keeping US forces over the horizon in the event that they fail in this task. In doing so, the US will not only forestall free-riding by regional actors whose interests are even more directly jeopardized by the rise of hegemonic powers in their immediate neighborhoods than those of the US, but will also inoculate Washington from becoming entrenched in local quarrels and conflicts that are tangential to its vital interests. By contrast, primacy views US interests more expansively, encompassing the ambitions of forestalling the rise of new great powers and promoting the global spread of democracy. Consequently, it mandates a relatively large US defense budget, the perpetuation of US standing alliances, and the forward deployment of US armed forces throughout the world.[75]

Whatever its additional merits, even modest grand strategic retrenchment will enhance US soft power vis-à-vis prospective allies in future wars. By even modestly circumscribing its military deployments and alliance commitments to allied states, the US would compel those states to take greater responsibility for ensuring their own security. This means that they will experience a heightened sense of threat in the event that a local rival pursues an expansionist drive to dominate the region and will be highly motivated to cooperate militarily with Washington to defeat the rival. By contrast, the maintenance of US primacy desensitizes regional actors that are already allied or aligned with the United States, and especially those which already house US military bases, to the threat posed to their security by neighboring adversaries. As a result, the US will possess less soft power vis-à-vis its partners and will be placed in the ironic position of having to cajole,

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[74]Mearsheimer, 'Imperial By Design,' 18.

[75]Exemplars of primacy, in both its neoconservative and liberal varieties, include William Kristol and Robert Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,' *Foreign Affairs* 75/4 (July/Aug. 1996), 18–33; Samuel P. Huntington, 'Why International Primacy Matters,' *International Security* 17/4 (Spring 1993), 68–84; G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton UP 2011); Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton UP 2008); and Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, 'Don't Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,' *International Security* 37/3 (Winter 2012/13), 7–51.

bribe, or otherwise beseech its local allies and partners to contribute to wars that more gravely threaten their survival than that of their hegemonic patron. The lower need for the US to expend hard power resources to secure allied cooperation in the former scenario adds an additional element of potential cost-savings attendant to the adoption of an offshore balancing strategy, which to date has been unappreciated by proponents.

Second, the US will also enjoy minimal soft power to the degree that it continues to embroil itself in counterinsurgency wars such as those it has most recently waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. These wars are distinguished from conventional inter-state conflicts by their exclusively defensive character.[76] An insurgent group is by definition a militarily weak actor which seeks to delegitimize and enervate the far stronger government of a given state by progressively weakening its perceived ability to protect and govern the populace. Insurgents are only capable of evading defeat and death by eschewing uniforms that would identify them as combatants, adopting indirect hit and run style tactics, and relying on supportive elements of the surrounding population to provide them with money, weapons, supplies, and sanctuary.[77] As a result, insurgents lack both the motivation and capability to pose a serious military threat to surrounding states.

After the rapid toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001 and Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath regime in Iraq in early 2003, both US-led wars transitioned into counterinsurgency campaigns.[78] During both campaigns, the US has had to deploy extensive hard power resources in the form of both bribes and conditional war-effort bolstering to enhance allied cooperation and forestall defections. This is easily explicable as US allies in both conflicts have participated in spite of the minimal threat posed to their security by either the reconstituted Taliban or the heterogeneous Iraqi insurgents, whose military capabilities are exceedingly weak and whose foremost goal is to overthrow the Afghan and Iraqi governments, respectively, not attack the US or its allies. This additional expense attached to counterinsurgency wars, which tend to be considerably more protracted than their conventional

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[76]Robert, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,' *World Politics* 30/2 (Jan. 1978), 204.

[77]*The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Univ. of Chicago Press 2007), Ch. 1 (1–52).

[78]See, respectively, Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton 2010); and Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama* (New York: Vintage 2013).

counterparts, represents a further disincentive for the US to become entangled in them in the first place.[79]

Acknowledgements

For their helpful advice, comments, and critiques, the author thanks the external reviewer, Alan Chong, Timothy Crawford, Giulio Gallarotti, Robert Jervis, Ong Weichong, Pascal Vennesson, and Keren Yarhi-Milo. He is also grateful to Ong Weichong for inviting him to participate in the 2012 Goh Keng Swee seminar that spawned this special issue. Part of this article was researched and written while the author was a Visiting Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, during the summer of 2014. He is grateful to SIWPS Director Richard K. Betts for granting him this opportunity.

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[79]Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2010).

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